Introduction
In the early 2lst century, it might seem surprising to still ask the question whether it is legitima te for judges to use the comparative method in their reasoning. The experience of teaching comparative law shows, however, that students, i.e. the judges and lawyers of tomorrow, despite the insights and the intellectual pleasure they derive from comparing laws, often doubt whether it is legitima te for courts to use comparative methodology. They also have doubts concerning the benefits they might be able to derive from the comparative method in their future practicallife as lawyers.
1 In contrast, they quickly recognize the use of comparative law with regard to legislation, whether on a national or international level, given that national and international legislators regularly rely on comparative studies when preparing legislation. Judges and lawyers 2 in sorne countries also still question the legitimacy of the use of comparative methodology by the courts.
The following reflections address the question of whether it is legitimate for the judge to resort to the comparative method in addition to the classic methods of determining and interpreting domestic law. If it is legitimate, is it beneficiai for the courts to use the comparative method? And if so, do the benefits of the comparative method justify the sometimes considerable effort that the comparative approach demands?
A practical example serves to illustrate that these questions are far from purely theoretical. The economy of a central European state undertakes privatization. A foreign investor buys one of the largest companies in that country. The company, which is of national importance (and too big to fail), risks bankruptcy but is saved by state investment in the region of several billion dollars. The state accuses the foreign investor of not having taken necessary measures to save the company, measures that the investor had been obliged to take under the privatization contract. The state therefore daims damages in the region of several billion dollars for the investments made to save the company.
The case is to be decided on the application of provisions of the civil code of the state concerned. There is little doctrine and no case law interpreting the applicable articles (provisions concerning contractual and tortious liability). That said, in neighbouring countries' codes, there are similar provisions which have been widely commented on and often applied by their courts. These codes served as an inspiration to the state's legislator at the time of codification of its domestic civillaw. 3 In such a case, is it legitima te for the court to take inspiration from foreign statu tory law, case law, and legal doctrine when dealing with the issue under the applicable domestic law? W ould lawyers be able to use, in the interest of their clients, other legal systems as a source of inspiration and support when proposing a certain interpretation of the law to the judges?
These questions are not limited to Europe. A very animated discussion among judges of the Supreme Court of the United States has helped in putting this issue on the agenda of judges, comparatists, and lawyers. 4 This contribution firstly analyses the arguments against and for the legitimacy of the comparative method when it cornes to applying domestic law (section II). Then, the benefits that may be derived from comparison by the judge are demonstrated. Numerous decisions of courts in Europe illustrate the reasons that lead to the use of comparative methodology and the multiple aims that the courts pursue by using this method (section III).
Il. Comparative law-a method at the disposai of the courts?
Is it legitimate to use comparative law?-Arguments against the use of comparative methodology by courts
Sorne arguments seem to speak against the use of the comparative method by the courts when interpreting nationallaw. 5 3 For more case scenarios, see T. Kadner Graziano, 'Comment enseigner et étudier le droit comparé?-Une proposition', 43 RDUS [2013] 61-87; German language version: 'Rechtsvergleichung lehren und lernen-ein Vorschlag aus Genf ', ZEuP 2014, 204-23 . 4 The discussion in the USA focuses on the comparative method in constitutionallaw. In Europe, the legitimacy of judicial comparison has hardly been discussed so far, comp. e.g. C. McCrudden, 'A Common Law of Human Rights? Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights', 20 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. [2000] 499 at 503: a tapie 'relatively ignored in the theoreticalliterature'; R. Reed, 'Foreign Precedents and Judicial Reasoning: the American Debate and British Practice', 124 LQR [2008] 253 at 259: the current discussion in the USA 'has no parallel in the United Kingdom or elsewhere in the common law world'. In the USA, the tapie is also regarded as 'under-theorized', R. Hirschl, 'The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law', 53 American J. Comp. L. [2005] 125. 5 For an emphatic statement against the use of comparative law by US Federal courts, see A. Scalia, 'Keynote Address: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal courts', in American Society oflnternational Law, fashions on Americans'. 8 In the majority opinion of the Court, Justice Kennedy, who frequently uses the comparative method, had referred to English law and the case law of the European Court of H uman Rights. According to Scalia, in his dissenting opinion, such considerations of foreign law would be 'meaningless dicta '. 9 
d) Legal science-a largely national science
Over the last few years, certain courts have once again emphasized the fact that, although comparativa est omnis investigatio and 'all forms ofhigher knowledge consist of comparison', 10 the law remains a largely national science. The Federal Supreme Administrative Court of Germany accordingly declared in a 1993 judgment that ' [d] ie Rechtswissenschaft ist eine national gepriigte Wissenschaft' 11 (legal science is a nationally characterized science). A German court of appeal expressly supported this view in a judgment in 2004 . This case related to the legitimacy of an agreement reached between a lawyer and his client concerning legal fees calculated according to the final result, Erfolgshonorare or contingency fees, 12 valid in US law but prohibited and hitherto deemed contrary to moral and legal standards by German law. 8 In Lawrence et al. v Texas 539 US 558 [2003] 
e) Lack of knowledge of foreign law and linguistic barriers
According to yet another argument, it is evident that the nationallegislator would not expect courts to have knowledge of foreign law. This knowledge would, however, be necessary to correctly employ the comparative method. Given that judges did not know or, at best, only knew a little foreign law, use of the comparative method would open the route to error, to danger of an incorrect understanding and a false interpretation of foreign law. 13 Added to which, there were often also linguistic barriers that made understanding foreign law particularly difficult and multiplied the risks of error.
14 Because of language barriers one US-author (and comparatist) has made the proposai to leave aside 'foreign-language law' when comparing. 15 Last but not least, the judge would simply not have the time and resources necessary to systematically carry out comparative research. 16 
j) The danger of cherry picking
Sorne have voiced criticism of the courts over selective citing of foreign law. lt would always be possible to find support in sorne countries for a solution that is favoured by the courts. In contrast, diverging solutions in other countries would not always be invoked. In certain cases, the courts relied on the comparative argument, whereas they rejected comparison when the solution found in foreign law differs from that which is preferred by the court. Here the argument in question is that of cherry picking. lt is used 33, introducing the notion of 'comparative foreign-language law': '(T]he general indifference of North American and Australasian courts and practitioners to the tort law of foreign-language jurisdictions seems a wise response from inescapable phenomena. For them there is no more to be reliably derived from foreignlanguage jurisdictions than from English-speaking ones . frequently by critics of the comparative approach in recent discussion in the USA and notably by judge Antonin Scalia.
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All of these arguments therefore seem to speak against the use of the comparative method by the courts.
Widening horizons-Arguments in favour of the use of comparative methodology by the courts
The question th us is, on the one hand, whether, and to what extent these arguments are convincing; and on the other hand, whether there are arguments favouring the use of comparative law by the judge when interpreting and applying domestic law.
a) Cherry picking-an apprehension that has not been con.firmed by court practice
The danger of cherry picking is not unique to the comparative argument. The risk exists just as weil in relation to differing opinions in doctrine and case law that also can be used and cited very selectively by courts. 18 Therefore, provided that the comparative method is used as seriously and balanced as every other method of interpretation, the danger of cherry picking does not question the legitimacy of comparison. In fact, numerous examples show that courts choose the jurisdictions for comparison very carefully and do not hesitate to cite foreign law in situations where the solution under foreign law differs from that preferred by the court. In these cases, comparative law is used in orcier to highlight the specificities of one's own domestic law.l 9 17 A. Scalia, n. 5, at 309: 'Adding foreign law ... is much like legislative history, which ordinarily con tains something for everybody and can be used or not used, used in one part or in another, deemed controlling or pronounced inconclusive, depending upon the result the court wishes to reach ... The Court's reliance has also been selective asto when foreign law is consulted at ali'; ibid.: 'To invoke allen law when it agrees with one's own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decision-making but sophistry', dissenting opinion in Roper v Simmons, US S. Ct., 543 US 551 [2005] 627; see also ChiefJustice of the US S. Ct. John Roberts: 'Foreign law, you can find anything you want. If you don't find it in the decisions of France or Italy, it's in the decisions of Somalia or Japan or Indonesia or wherever. As somebody said in another context, looking at foreign law for support is like looking over a crowd for support and picking out your friends ... And that actually expands the discretion of the judge. It allows the judge to incorporate his or her own persona! preferences, cl oak them with the authority of precedent . 
b) Information on foreign law increasingly accessible
In orcier to a void error and misunderstanding as to the content of foreign law, and so that the court has a solid basis for the use of the comparative method, it is effectively essential that the judge is provided with trustworthy, sound, and reliable information on the substance of foreign law. 20 For numero us points of law, this information is now available. First of ail and most obviously, the Internet makes access to information on foreign law as weil as access to foreign case law much easier. Moreover, several institutions and research groups and numerous comparatists substantiaily contribute to the circulation of knowledge on foreign law. To name just sorne of the particularly active institutions and groups, it is possible to mention the Providing reliable information on foreign and comparative law, in languages easily accessible, is therefore the responsibility of comparatists and researchers using a comparative approach in their publications. English judges have expressly noted that without these publications, comparison would not have been possible for the court. In a case brought before the court, it is also possible for this comparative research to be carried out on an ad hoc basis by comparative law institutions and lawyers 23 (or their trainees) trained in comparative law. 24 Christopher McCrudden recalls that 'where lawyers appearing before the courts, or clerks assisting the judge, give the judge confidence, then the decisions of foreign systems are more likely to be cited.' 25 Thanks to this information on foreign law, error and misunderstanding in the substance of foreign law can be avoided. Consequently, this argument does not question the legitimacy and practicability of comparison either.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, judge at the US Supreme Court, has stated in this respect: '(W]e should approach foreign legal materials with sensitivity to our differences, deficiencies, and imperfect understanding, but imperfection, I believe, should not lead us to abandon the effort to learn what we can from the experience and good thinking foreign sources may convey.' 26
c) Access ta foreign law-the private international law argument
In cross border cases which present doser links with a foreign legal system than with the law of the jurisdiction in which a legal action is brought, the forum's private international law sometimes obliges the court to resolve the case solely on the application of foreign law. The existence of priva te international law rules clearly shows that the legislators believe it is possible for the national judge to be informed about the substance of foreign law in a reliable and trustworthy wayP
d) The comparative methodology-a method of interpretation like the others
It is clear that the nationallegislator does not expect courts or lawyers to know foreign law as they know domestic law. It is equally clear that judges and lawyers cannot resort to the comparative method in every case.
In situations where such knowledge is not available or accessible, the court cannot be expected to use the comparative approach. However, in cases where content of foreign law is brought to the attention of the court, the judges are in a position to build on this knowledge and to use the comparative arguments when interpreting domestic law.
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The fact that the comparative method can be used in sorne cases and not in others is not unique to this method. While the literai rule and perhaps also the purposive approach are methods of interpretation that are always available to the court, this is not the case for other methods of statutory interpretation. This is true notably in relation to the historical interpretation, which draws inspiration from the legislative history of the law, and the systematic interpretation, both of which will assist the judge, much like the comparative method, in his search for a solution to specifie problems in sorne cases and not in others.
e) Revival of a European legal science
The argument that legal science is a largely national science is another argument against the use of comparative law that barely convinces. Throughout a large part of the 20th century, in co un tries such as German y and France, legal science was effective! y a widely national science. However, in other countries, notably the UK as well as sorne countries in continental Europe, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, and Switzerland, legal science has never been limited to a single national law. On the contrary, the doctrine in these jurisdictions, and to sorne extent also the court practice, has a long history of using the comparative approach. 29 In the second half of the 20th century, more and more legal scientists have been arguing in favour of an internationalization (or more accurately, a re-internationalization 30 ) oflegal science. 31 These pleas were eventually successful and we observe today a renaissance of a truly international science of law in Europe. In law, ideas and solutions are circulating across borders again. From a US perspective, Matthias Reirnann has observed in this respect: 'In Western Europe, comparative legal studies have ... gained a momentum and a significance unprecedented in the last hundred years . . . From an American perspective, one may .. . look across the Atlantic with envy these days. Comparative law in Europe is a hot topic. lt is practically relevant, self-confident, and enjoys a high profile.' 32 28 For the important role th at lawyers might play in this respect, see section II.2.b ). 29 References in section III. See also E. Hondius, n. 13, p. 759 at 765: 'It has been suggested that, if one wishes to consider legal research a science, [focusing on domestic developments] is the wrong attitude. Science knows no borders, and legal science is no exception.'
30 Before the period of the codification of the law started on the continent, legal discourse on the continent was truly European using the same language, Latin; see e.g. R. Zimmermann, 
j) The judge's freedom to choose his methods of determining the law-revival of the idea of justice that transcends borders
Another argument against the use of the comparative method asserts that every law and judgment is the result of a weighing of interests which would necessarily have to take place within each country's own cultural context. 33 This argument overlooks the fact that these days, the nationallegislators themselves rely on extensive comparative research in practically every important legislative procedure and, at any rate, in matters of priva te law. To cite just a few recent examples: The recent codifications in the Bal tic States have largely taken inspiration from comparative studies. The Estonian legislator has followed the example of the German civil code in his new codification of the law of obligations (and has introduced, for example, a general part in the new Law of Obligations and has, e.g. in torts, codified the essence of a century of German case law). The legislator has also widely taken inspiration from Swiss law, Dutch law, the laws of Quebec and Louisiana, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), the Principles of European Contract Law, and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. 34 The new Lithuanian Civil Code of 2000 takes inspiration, amongst others, from the codifications and statutes of the Netherlands, Québec, Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, Latvia, Japan, and Russia, as well as from the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles. 35 Polish law has recently taken inspiration from German and Dutch law, as well as the CISG and the Princip les of European Con tract Law. In Central and Eastern European countries, the comparative method plays such an important role in modern legislation that it was affirmed that 'the main method used for private law in today's legislative drafting is the comparative method'. 36 In 2002, the German civil code (the BGB) experienced the most important reform since it came into force in 1900. 37 Initiated by a European Directive, the drafting process of this reform took inspiration from a wide range of European jurisdictions. 38 In China, important law reforms have taken place over the last 15 years, in particular with the adoption of the Chinese Contract Act of 1999, the Law of Property Act of 2007, and the Tort Law Act of2010. Among the sources of inspiration for the Con tract Act were the codifications of Germany, Japan, and Taiwan, the English Common Law, and US law, as well as the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles oflnternational Commercial Contracts and the Principles of European Contract Law. 39 The new Law of Property Act drew inspiration from the laws of Germany, France, Japan, and Taiwan and from sorne aspects of English and US law. 40 Recently, a draft version of a Chinese Civil Code was presented. The structure of the draft code was inspired by the example of the Pandects and by Dutch law. 41 These varied examples show that preparing legislation in the field of priva te law does not take place in a context that is purely specifie to each state, but within the context of a European-wide discussion, or, in the case of Chinese law, the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles, in a worldwide context.
The fact that the legislator himself uses the comparative method in the preparation of domestic law has an important implication for its interpretation: if the legislator takes inspiration from foreign law, because he is inspired by an idea of justice existing beyond state borders, the judge must be able to follow this approach when applying the law. In this sense, article 1 section 2 of the Swiss Civil Code expressly states that 'à défaut d'une disposition applicable, le juge prononce selon le droit coutumier et, à défaut d'une coutume, selon les règles qu'il établirait s'il avait à faire acte de législateur' (in the absence of a provision, the court shall decide in accordance with customary law and, in the absence of customary law, in accordance with the rule that it would make as legislator). This provision expresses a general idea according to which the judge is invited to resort to the same sources of inspiration and methods used by the legislator, notably including the comparative method. 42 This is true, as is explicitly stated in article 1 section 2 of the Swiss Civil Code, in the absence of a legal provision. In many jurisdictions, it is recognized toda y that this also a pp lies in cases of uncertainty of the law and when interpreting it, since filling gaps in the law and interpreting it are merely two sides of the same coin. 43 The Swiss Federal Court has consequently stated that 'when interpreting the law, ail traditional methods of interpretation are to be taken into consideration (systematic, purposive, and historie ... as weil as comparative), all of which are used by the Federal Court in a pragmatic way without giving priority or preference to one of these methods over the others '. 44 In the same spirit, the highest court in Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court, has repeatedly confirmed that the judge is not bound when it cornes to choosing his methods of determining the law. In the 1990s the Constitutional Court held: 'Artikel 20 III of the Fondamental Law [Grundgesetz, i.e. the German Constitution] requires that the judge decides "according to law and justice". The Constitution does not prescribe a particular method of interpretation (or even a purely literai inter- pretation).' 45 The court further held that '[t]he courts are bound only by the law and they are not required to follow an opinion that is prevailing in legal doctrine, nor are they obliged to follow the precedents of higher courts; on the contrary, they can follow their own legal opinion and perception of the law .. . The judge is required to decide according to law and justice (Art. 20 III GG); with respect to the prohibition to render arbitrary decisions, the judge has to give reasons for his decision . . . In any case, the judge must show that the decision is based on an in depth legal analysis; his view also must not be deprived of objective reasons.' 46 In a 1953 ruling, the Federal Constitutional Court expressly recognized the use of the comparative method by the courts to fill gaps in domestic law and to interpret itY
In other jurisdictions on the continent, legal provisions defining methods of statutory interpretation by the judge are limited to stating general principles, emphasizing the freedom of the judge to interpret and, if necessary, to develop the law. 48 For common law and mixed jurisdictions, Robert Reed, judge at the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, has noted with respect to the freedom of judges to choose their sources of inspiration:
Scottish and English judges have for centuries drawn on ideas developed in other jurisdictions (both common law and civilian) . .. Judicial reasoning has been seen as a process of rational inquiry, in which there are not in principle any sources of ideas which are off-limit. Judicial reasoning in this country has not been thought of in national terms, with non-national sources of ideas being regarded as suspect: on the contrary, it has long been thought sensible to consider how others, from Ancient Rome onwards, have resolved similar problems. If judges are free to take account of the views of academie lawyers writing in law reviews, whether they are based in Cambridge, England, or Cambridge, Massachusetts, there would seem to be no reason why the opinions of foreign courts should be off-limits.
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The courts consequently benefit from a substantial freedom in their choice of the methods they apply to determine the law and they are free with respect to the choice of their sources of inspiration. Numerous examples cited in the third part of this contribution show that in many jurisdictions, judges use the comparative method to fill gaps in domestic law and when interpreting it, without questioning the legitimacy of comparison. 50 45 BVerfG 30.03.1993, BVerfGE 88, 145; NJW 1993 NJW , 2861 NJW (2863 . 46 BVerfG 19.07. 1995 , NJW 1995 , 2911 . 47 18.12.1953 
g) Choice of the most convincing solution while respecting the national legal system
The argument that the use of the comparative method risks harming the national legal systems is also not convincing. It is true that, in every interpretation of domestic law, the system of the domestic law (be it a national codification or a case law system) must be respected as far as possible. This aim can be achieved through systematic interpretation which is one of the principal methods of interpretation of law. Indeed, like every other method of interpretation, the comparative interpretation must allow an interpretation and development of the law so that, out of the possible solutions, the most convincing is chosen while preserving coherence within the domestic system of law. 5 1 h) The authority of foreign law-a persuasive authority lt is clear that the judge is bound by domestic law as weil as by any provisions of international law in force in his country. Neither foreign statutory law nor foreign case law has democratie legitimacy in the judge's country. In relation to the use of the comparative method, two consequences follow from this: Firstly, when the text of domestic law in force in the judge's country is clear and its interpretation does not leave any room for doubt, the judge is bound by his country's law. In principle, he cannat deviate from the result prescribed by the law in arder to reach another result by using the comparative method; this is even true in cases where the judge finds this other result more adequate, appropriate, and fair, taking into account ail the interests at stake. 52 In They cannat deviate from federal law arguing that the result under this legal provision is ... undesirable. It is however possible to deviate from a legal provision in cases where the legislator has obviously committed an legislator (national or international) to solve the problem (if there is a problem). But aren't situations rare where interpretation of domestie law doesn't leave space for doubt or a margin of appreciation for the judge? Numerous uncertainties in domestie law, the demands of interpretation, as well as, in sorne cases, conflicts between traditional rules of civil law and constitutional values, make the scope of application of the comparative methodology very large. Secondly, foreign legislation and case law can never bind the national judge. The authority of foreign law can only be a persuasive authority. 54 The more the values in one country and another are similar or shared, the more important is the persuasive authority of the other country's law. 5 5 The more a certain issue is politieally sensitive, and the more partieular circumstances in a given country led to the adoption of a specifie rule or result, the less willing will judges be to draw inspiration from foreign law and experience. This is possibly the reason why the use of comparative law in certain constitutional issues before the US Supreme Court has been partieularly controversial and disputed over the last years, whereas the use of this same method goes without saying in matters of priva te law in the USA.
i) Soft harmonization of the law within the context of regional integration
Finally, the use of the comparative method is justified nowadays, in member co un tries of the European Union, by the membership of these countries in the Union. According to article 3, section 3 of the Treaty on European Union, the Union sets itself the objective, among others, of establishing an internai market and promoting economie cohesion among Member States. The convergence of provisions applicable to economie relations contributes notably to the achievement of this aim, in areas such as con tract law, tort law, and, for certain questions, property law. In such matters, a comparative interpretation can result in 'soft harmonization' of the law whieh constitutes, at least for sorne matters, an interesting alternative to harmonization through enacting legislation. In relation to this, Walter Odersky, the former President of the German Federal Court, has written: error or when the circumstances have changed since the enactment of the provision to the point that its application would constitute an abuse of right).
54 See e.g. P. K. Tripathi, 'Foreign Precedents and Constitutional Law', 57 Columbia L. Rev. [1957] 319 at 346: 'Wh en a judge looks to foreign legal systems for analogies th at shed light on any of the new cases before hirn, he is looking to legal material which he is absolutely free to reject unless it appeals to his reason'; V. Jackson, n. 9, at 114: 'Transnational sources are seen as interlocutors, offering a way of testing and understanding one' s own traditions and possibilities by examining them in the reflection of others'; 56 See n. 9. The persuasive authority of the comparative argument !oses weight if the fundamental values differ from one jurisdiction to the other, see e.g. A. Scalia, n. 5, p. 310: 'Ifthere was any thought absolutely foreign to the founders of our country, surely it was the notion that we Americans should be governed the way Europeans are. And nothing has changed.'
The national judge has not only the right to rely on interpretations from other legal systems and courts in his judgment, but also the right, when applying domestic law, and naturally when weighing up ail interests and points of view to be taken into consideration in the interpretation and development of the law, to attach a certain importance to the fact that the solution in consideration contributes to the harmonization of European law. Following this reasoning, the judge may, if need be, follow the solution from another legal system as the result of a weighing of interests. With the progressive process of European integration, the judge should use this reasoning more and more often. 57 39 According to Christopher McCrudden the impulse to use comparative law 'will be strongest . .. when the integration is set out explicitly as a political programme, with institutional characteristics, such as in Europe. Indeed, the comparative method is there explicitly built into the fabric of judicial decision-making'. 
Intermediate conclusions
In the search for a fair solution, the judge benefits from substantial freedom to choose his sources of legal knowledge and inspiration. In a large number of countries, judges are nowadays convinced that comparative law is one of the legitimate methods of interpretation of domestic law, and rightly so. The examples cited in the third section of this contribution will show that national courts draw inspiration from foreign solutions when interpreting domestic law. Indeed, important innovations notably in English, German, Austrian, Swiss, and US judiciallaw have taken inspiration from comparison with solutions that are in force abroad. 5 9 In current US discussion, Ruth Bader Gins burg, judge of the US Supreme Court, has written: 'The US judicial system will be poorer, I believe, if we do not both share our experience with, and learn from, legal systems with values and a commitment to democracy similar to our own . .. [W] e are not so wise that we have nothing to learn from other democratie legal systems newer to judicial review for constitutionality.' 60 Sonia Sotomayor, appointed in 2009 to the US Supreme Court, stated in the year ofher appointment: ' (T]o the extent that we have freedom of ideas, international law and foreign law will be very important in the discussion of how to think about the unsettled issues of our legal system'. 61 
Introduction
If it is legitima te to compare, is it beneficia! and appropria te for the courts to resort to the comparative method? Do the benefits of the comparative method justify the sometimes considerable effort that the comparative approach demands?
In sorne co un tries, judges are nowadays convinced of the benefits of this method. An analysis of around 1500 judgments of the Swiss Federal Court has shown that in around 10 per cent of cases the court refers to one or more foreign legal systems for the purpose of comparison. 67 In matters concerning tort law, over the last few years, the percentage of the Federal Court's judgments that use the comparative approach has exceeded 20 per cent. 68 In other countries on the continent, the courts occasionally resort to the comparative method. 69 In English law, judgments in which the judges not only cite decisions from other common law jurisdictions, but also the laws, judgments, and doctrine from continental Europe, have multiplied over the last few years.7° According to a recent study, for the period of 1996 to 2005, between 25 and 33 per cent of House of Lords decisions have included comparative references to other legal systems. 71 Comparison is no longer limited to priva te law.7
4 An increasing number of public or constitutionallaw courts have also resorted to the comparative method. In the USA, Justice Scalia, despite being opposed to the comparative approach, has stated: In many ... cases, opinions for the Court have used foreign law for the purpose of interpreting the Constitution ... I expect ... that the Court's use of foreign law in the interpretation of the Constitution will continue at an accelera ting pace ... [U] se of comparative law in our constitutional decisions is the wave of the future. 7 5 Based on an international survey Christopher McCrudden, constitutional lawyer at Queen's College, University of Belfast, found:
It is now commonplace in many jurisdictions as well as for courts to refer extensively to the decisions of foreign jurisdictions when interpreting human rights guarantees.7 6
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 express! y invites courts to use the comparative method in matters concerning fundamental rights. The provision states: 'Wh en interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum ... (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law.' 77 The Constitutional Court of South Africa is consequently today among the most active actors regarding a transnational judicial discourse.7 8
Benefits of using the comparative methodology
The reasons to resort to the comparative method, the aims pursued by the courts by comparing, and the assets of this method are plentiful. 
a) Positioning the national law in the internationallegallandscape
In sorne cases, courts cite foreign and international law in orcier to show that the national law is fully in line with modern solutions or international trends. This is frequently the case in Central or Eastern European countries that have recently reformed and re-codified their law. An example is the case law of the Lithuanian Supreme Court. The court has frequently referred to the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, the Principles of European Contract Law, the Principles of European Tort Law, and the Draft Common Frame of Reference, usually with the aim of showing that the new Lithuanian Civil Code is fully in line with these modern soft law princip les.
b) Complementary to the historical method of interpretation
Courts often cite foreign law or soft law princip les that have served as an inspiration to the nationallegislator for their own legislation. In these cases the comparative method plays a support role which complements the historical method of interpretation of domestic law.
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In two decisions of 2010 and 2011 , the Supreme Court of Lithuania has stated that the provisions of the Lithuanian Civil Code which were adopted under the influence of the UNIDROIT Principles shall be interpreted in the light of the Principles. 82 To cite another example: in a landmark case of 2006, the Federal Court of Switzerland had to rule on the scope of damages for breach of contract. A parrot breeder had bought six parrots for his breeding farm. They were infected with a virus that was subsequently transmitted to the other birds in the breeding farm. As a result, ail birds died and the breeder suffered a loss of around two million Swiss francs . He brought a daim for damages against the seller of the infected birds. The daim raised the issue of the scope and the limits of the seller' s contractualliability.
The Swiss Federal Court awarded damages and, in defining the scope of contractual liability under article 208, sections 2 and 3 of the Swiss Code of Obligations, drew inspiration from the French author Pothier's Treatise on the Law of Obligations as weil as from article 1150 of the French Civil Code, which were already known and had inspired the legislator when the Swiss Code of Obligations was being prepared. 83 The 
c) Discovering the diversity of solutions from which the court can choose
Courts use the comparative approach in order to discover and demonstrate the diversity of solutions in force in different jurisdictions and from which the court can choose when interpreting domestic law. 86 Recent English case law has given, in sorne cases, an impressive comparative The Supreme Federal Court of Switzerland frequently analyses and cites the laws of countries that border Switzerland, namely, French, German, Austrian, and Italian law. 91 Sometimes, the comparative overview is established by the court itself. More frequently the courts rely on comparative studies previously published by comparatists. Comparison thus widens the horizon and completes the picture of possible interpretations and solutions that are available to the courts to resolve a specifie question. By using the comparative method, judges complete and improve the quality of their reasoning. For ... judges, looking abroad simply helps them to do a better job at home, in the sense that they can approach a particular problem more creatively or with greater insight. Foreign authority ... provides a broader range of ideas and experience that makes for better, more reflective opinions. This is the most frequent cited rationale advanced by judges regarding the virtues of looking abroad. In numerous judgments, courts cite foreign solutions in order to confront them with the solution that they have found for their own domestic law. They hereby illustrate the aims and particularities of their domestic law. 93 By way of example, it's possible to mention a decision of the Federal Court of Germany (BGH) concerning the protection of personality rights and the right to privacy (Caroline de Monaco). Here the court compared German and French law, observing that the scope of the right to privacy is more limited in German law than in French law when opposed to the freedom of the press. 94 A German court of appeal provides another illustration in which the court cited US practice with respect to contingency fee agreements (i.e. agreements according to which the lawyer's fees depend on the outcome of the case). The court ultimately sets out that such agreements would be irreconcilable with the role of lawyers in German civil procedure. 95 In Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary, the English House of Lords notes that exemplary or punitive damages do not exist either in continental civil law systems, such as German and French law, nor in mixed legal systems which are influenced by both civil and common laws, such as Scots and South African law. The court therefore observes that, for the matter in question, it is 'unhelpful to look at the position in other jurisdictions '. 96 In Awoyomi v Radford, the Queen' s Ben ch Division of the English High Court refers to case law from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) concerning the immediate or future effects of a change in case law (the question of prospective overruling), before deciding that the case law of the ECJ could be materially distinguished from English law. 97 92 A.-M. Slaughter, n. 74, at 201. 93 Compare A. Gerber, n. 67, p. 154; V. Jackson, n. 9, at 117: ' [C] omparison can shed light on the distinctive functioning of one's own system .. . considering the questions other systems pose may sharpen understanding of how we are different', 128: 'engagement with foreign law . . . does not necessarily mean adoption, but thoughtful, well-informed consideration'; M. Minow, n. 9, text following n. 56: 'Looking at what others do may sharpen our sense of our differences rather than produce a sense of pressure to conform'; E. Young, n. 6, at 158: 'If American courts were to conclude that only domestic practice is relevant, then their judges might fee! pressure to distinguish American mores ... from the views they encounter on their European sabbaticals.' 94 BGH 19.12.1995, BGHZ 131, 332 at 337 (taking inspiration from US law) and at 344 (opposing French law); for this use of the comparative method, see also the Swiss cases TF 04. 06.1981 , ATF 107 II 105 at 111; TF 18.05.1973 , ATF 99 IV 75 at 76. 95 OLG Celle 26.11.2004 , NJW 2005 , 2160 . See, however, the German case: Constitutional Court 12.12.2006 , 1 BvR 2576 /04, BVerfGE 11 7, 163, NJW 2007 The question of pre-contractualliability was addressed in the case of Chartbrook v Persimmon Homes. The House of Lords invoked the Princip les of European Con tract Law, the UNIDROIT Principles oflnternational Commercial Contracts, and the CISG to highlight that the philosophy on which these regulations are founded differs from English contract law. 98 It is also possible to mention judgments from the Swiss Federal Court concerning the conditions for the transfer of persona! property. The court decided that, in contrast to German law (expressly indicating article 931 of the BGB), in Swiss law the ownership of movables cannot be passed on by the assignment of an action for recovery of the object. 99 The Federal Court therefore demonstrates that another outcome would be possible and practicable, but that there are reasons why it is not favoured by the court.
In another, nowadays classic, case, the Swiss Federal Court explicitly abandoned a solution formerly taken from German law according to which the transfer of ownership is separa te from the validity of the con tract of sale. The court th us discarded the abstraction principle, a pillar of German property law. 10 0
In a case concerning a legal action brought by an environmental protection foundation, the Swiss Federal Court came to the conclusion that French legislation and case law, which was cited by the court of first instance, 'ne se concilient pas avec l'état actuel de notre législation' 101 (cannot be reconciled with the current state of our legislation). These examples show that the use of comparative law by courts is not at alllimited to situations where the foreign solution is the one favoured by the courts. On the contrary, when the court's solution differs from another country's solution, the comparative approach can cause the court to expose national particularities and historical and cultural divergences that lead the court to favour one solution over another. In these cases, the comparative method contributes to a greater transparency and a better quality of reasoning. McCrudden concludes with respect to this purpose of judicial comparison: a use of foreign ... law does not mean that the approach taken in the other jurisdiction will necessarily be adopted, just that it is considered . .. Even where the result of the foreign judicial approach has not been adopted, it has often been influential in sharpening the understanding of the court' s view on domestic law. 102
e) Countering the argument that a certain solution willlead to harmful results
The experiences in other jurisdictions are frequently cited by courts to counter the argument that a certain solution or interpretation of the law would have harmful or disastrous results.
Illustrations of this use of the comparative method are particularly common in English and US case law. For example, according to an old common law rule, someone who makes a payment following a mistake of law rather than a mistake of fact cannot seek restitution of the payment. In Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council, the Bouse of Lords abandoned this solution. The comparative approach was used to counter the argument that a right to restitution would result in a flood of litigation.
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In the English case Arthur Hall v Simons, the court considered the question of immunity oflegal professionals for conduct during legal procedures. The court referred to the experiences of other countries in order to show that such immunity is not justified by practical needs, and the court subsequently abandoned the immunity. 104 This use of the comparative method has furthermore been considered legitimate even by those who are in general opposed to the use of comparative law by the courts. In this respect, Justice Scalia has written: I suppose foreign statutory and judiciallaw can be consulted in assessing the argument that a particular construction of an ambiguous provision in a federal statute would be disastrous. If foreign courts have long been applying precisely the rule argued against, and disaster has not ensued, unless there is sorne countervailing factor at work, the argument can safely be rejected. 
f) Legal support for value judgments of the court
Often references to foreign law also play a role in highlighting that the solution favoured by the court is already recognized by other legal systems as being unbiased and fair, even if the legal approach to reaching this solution may differ from one country to another. This use of the comparative argument is particularly common and useful for the court when the decision is based on value judgments. In these situations, references to foreign legislation and case law provide legal support for the court's balancing of conflicting values. 106 In two landmark cases, the Supreme Court of Austria consecutively allowed, in Austrian law, liability for nervous shock and damages for immaterial harm following the loss of a close relation (damages for bereavement). 113 The court cited, as sources of inspiration and to support overruling previous case law, Swiss, French, Italian, Spanish, Scots, Greek, Yugoslavian, Belgian, and Turkish law. The court found information on these laws in the writings of comparatists. It seems that the desire to avoid isolation and to support majority trends in Europe was not the least of motivations for the Austrian Supreme Court.
In sorne decisions, foreign solutions are cited obiter dictum to draw attention to new problems that have not yet been dealt with by the national legislator or by domestic case law. In these situations, the aim is to encourage the legislator and doctrine to examine the problem and to work out a solution.U 4 More commonly, the court itself will introduce a new solution. A well-known illustration can be found in decisions in Germany that recognized personality rights and the right to privacy as an absolu te right, protected by the means of tort liability ( § 823, section 1 of the BGB and article 2, section 1 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany). The Federal Court of Germany 115 as well as the German Constitutional Court 116 found support in foreign laws when introducing a protection of personality rights and of privacy ('Allgemeines Personlichkeitsrecht'). 11 7 In an English case in 1991 the court still stated that '(i]t is weil known that in English law there is no right to privacy'.U 8 If the judgments of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, notably in Douglas and others v Hello! Ltd 119 and Naomi Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd, 120 were to change the law, it would be largely thanks to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and-last but not least-the influence of comparative law.
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Another example is provided by the decisions concerning daims brought by parents, and indeed children, against doctors for damages following an unwanted birth. The issue of medical malpractice for 'wrongfullife', 'wrongful birth', or 'wrongful pregnancy' has been considered by the courts in many jurisdictions over the last few years.
In Germany, the landmark case in this matter, published in the official collection under the English title 'wrongfullife', drew inspiration from the case law of the English Court of Appeal as weil as US law. 122 The Swiss Federal Court took inspiration from German and Dutch case law, distinguishing itself from case law of the English Ho use of Lords and the Supreme Court of Austria. 123 In another landmark decision, the Supreme Court of Austria in turn took inspiration from French, Italian, Scots, and Danish law, while distinguishing German, Dutch, Belgian, and Spanish law. 124 Dutch case law took German law into consideration, and in turn, exerted an influence on Scots law. 125 In France, on the initiative of the judges of the Cour de Cassation, the case 'Perruche' was preceded by comparative studies on liability for wrongful life and wrongful birth, from which it drew inspiration. 126 In truth, judgments relating to this issue that have not referred to foreign case law are very rare.
In Germany, an important procedural innovation, namely the publication of dissenting opinions of judges in the Federal Constitutional Court's judgments, has drawn inspiration from Anglo-Saxon law. 127 
h) Legal discourse on an international sc ale and 'soft harmonization'
lt is possible to identify an eighth and final effect (and perhaps also a final objective) of comparison by the courts. In the aforementioned decisions, as well as in many others, courts draw inspiration from the laws of jurisdictions sharing the same values. In sorne cases, the courts adopt in their case law a truly European or even a global perspective.
By demonstrating such open-mindedness, judges pave the way for discussion of legal problems on a European, or indeed a global, scale, thus creating a genuine European or even global community of lawyers who are able to comfortably discuss with each other. 128 In situations where this discussion leads to shared beliefs and solutions, comparison con tribu tes to 'soft harmonization' of the law on a supranational scale. 129 
IV. Conclusions
From these reflections, a number of conclusions can be drawn:
S. The aforementioned case law bears witness to the fact that courts, and notably supreme courts, pursue several objectives when using the comparative approach. Courts use the comparative approach:
• in order to demonstrate that the domestic law is fully in line with modern international trends; • to complement the historical method of interpretation of domestic law;
• to discover and demonstrate the diversity of solutions from which the courts may choose; • to benefit from experiences made abroad and to avoid reinventing the wheel again and again; • to sharpen one's own understanding of certain legal problems and to compare the national solution with differing foreign solutions in order to highlight the particularities of the domestic law; • to counter arguments that a given solution willlead to harmful or disastrous results; • to find legal support for a value judgment by the court; and finally, • to justify changes to domestic case law or to confront new problems, introduce new institutions or remedies.
6. Insofar as judges agree to take inspiration from foreign law or international principles derived from comparison, the comparative method will also become an important tool for lawyers who wish to use it in court in the interest of their clients.
7. So th at the court has a solid base for use of the comparative method, it is essential to provide judges with reliable, solid, and trustworthy information as to the content of foreign law. This responsibility falls with the researchers and comparatists who use the comparative approach in their publications. Regarding a case before the court, this comparative research could also be undertaken, and information provided, on an ad hoc basis by comparative law institutions or by lawyers or their staff trained in comparative law.
8. With the progressive programme of European integration, and notably in matters affecting economie relationships, the judge could use the comparative interpretation while pursuing the aim of soft harmonization which provides an alternative to legislative harmonization ('bottom up' instead of 'top clown' approach to harmonization).
9. By using the comparative method, courts contribute to the establishment of a legal discourse that transcends borders. They hereby contribute to the creation of a genuine European or even global community of lawyers who are able to comfortably communicate with each other about topicallegal issues.
Th us, the widespread belief in the judiciary of the legitimacy and the multiple benefits of judicial comparison is well founded. With respect to this topic, Thomas Bingham has most aptly made the following point:
In no other field of intellectual endeavour-be it science, medicine, philosophy, literature, architecture, art, music, engineering or sociology-would ideas or insights
